With the development and popularization of Software-Defined Networking (SDN), security threats on SDN are on the rise. As one of the most common attacks on the Internet, Denial of Service (DoS) may possibly prevent SDN controllers from offering services through the consumption of network or system resources. This paper introduces Extenics into the research on strategy generation for the mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers from the formal point of view. Considering the problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers for SDN controllers, the extension strategy generation method based on Extenics is utilized. According to the performance indicators of SDN controllers, the generated mitigation strategy focuses on the dynamic adjustment of computing resources in order to reduce the negative effects of DoS attacks. The experimental analysis validates that the application of the extension strategy generation method is feasible and promotes the formalization to generate the strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers.
Introduction
As an emerging technology, Software-Defined Networking (SDN) is mainly characterized by the separation of the control plane and the data plane, which makes the underlying network facilities transparent to the upper applications. The southbound interface technology of SDN, represented by OpenFlow, allows the underlying forwarding devices to be uniformly controlled and managed, and their specific physical implementation will be transparent.
OpenFlow-based SDN consists of three parts: OpenFlow switch for forwarding of the date layer, flow visor for network virtualization, and controller for controlling the network comprehensively in order to achieve the function of the control layer. When a new flow request arrives at the switch, if there is no matching flow rule in the flow table of the switch, the switch will forward the request information to the controller. Then, the controller will make a corresponding response policy and deliver it to the designated port of the switch.
As one of the most common attacks on the Internet, Denial of Service (DoS) may possibly prevent SDN controllers from offering services through the consumption of network or system resources. Although attack methods are different from each other, DoS attacks are mainly divided into the bandwidth consumption attack and the resource consumption attack. The bandwidth consumption attack is characterized by sending numerous useless packets to the victim host from the controlled puppet host in order to consume the bandwidth resources and block the network of the victim host. Meanwhile, the resource consumption attack consumes the system resources of the victim host by sending many seemingly legitimate requests.
The purpose of both two types of DoS attacks is to prevent the target SDN controller from offering services normally by consuming its resources. When the attack occurs, the attack mitigation strategy is needed to ensure the normal operation of the controller by computing resources according to the performance indicators and the dynamic adjustment. This paper aims to propose the use of the extension strategy generation method based on Extenics to generate the strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses issues related to studies on DoS attacks for SDN. Section 3 proposes the application of the extension strategy generation method by establishing the extension model and generating the strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers. Section 4 provides experimental analysis to validate the feasibility of applying the extension strategy generation method for the problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers. Section 5 concludes this paper and prospects for future work.
Related Researches on DoS Attacks for SDN
As for SDN, the controller is the core of the entire network. In recent years, scholars at home and abroad have conducted research on DoS attacks for SDN.
Reference [1] has confirmed that the performance of the controller in the network will significantly influence the performance of the SDN network; in other words, the broken controller can collapse the entire SDN network. Meanwhile, DoS/Distributed DoS (DDoS) attacks on SDN differ from those on the traditional network because of SDN's special structure. Reference [2] has shown that when an attacker sends numerous false requests to the controller continuously through different switches, the controller will be busy answering the attacker's illegal requests instead of making responses to the normal ones of the legitimate users. Additionally, when the number of false requests exceeds a certain degree in a short time, the controller may stop running due to the excessive consumption of computing and storing resources [3] .
Based on the K-Nearest Neighbor (KNN) algorithm, the attack detection method proposed in reference [4] saves computing time and cuts spending by combining the K-Dimensional (KD) Tree with the KNN algorithm. Reference [5] first classifies the information flow by using Self Organizing Maps (SOM) and then detects its attack-related six-tuple information. This method involves low consumption and high detection rate. As for detecting the attack data, reference [6] first uses the Support Vector Machine (SVM) as the classification algorithm and the linear function as the kernel function, which is also based on the extracted four characteristic attributes to construct the feature sample of the flow table. Then, a mitigation mechanism of DDoS attack is proposed, including the management and control, rate limiting, and shunting of the Access Control List (ACL).
To block the attack flow, reference [7] adds the flow table by combining the Principal Component Analysis (PCA) algorithm with the SDN technology and the Application Programming Interface (API) provided by the controller. Reference [8] proposes an anomalous traffic detection method based on SDN in order to detect the anomalous traffic. The statistical information of the data plane is obtained through the controller, and the PCA method is used to analyse the network source node and the sample source entropy matrix consisting of the destination node pair.
The research above mainly focuses on the detection of attack traffic and attack defence methods. However, mitigating DoS attacks against SDN controllers is also an effective way to solve the security threat issues for SDN.
Reference [9] creates a security application on the controller along with learning switch, device manager, and topology applications, in order to detect and react to the DoS attacks dynamically. It also mitigates DoS attacks according to three messages: packet in, switch statistics, and port status.
Reference [10] adds a flow collector and applies the statistic method to analyse the non-valid packet sent by the SDN controller. If the volume of the non-valid packet per time window exceeds a given value, the controller will apply a new rule for each network device to forward the non-valid packet directly to the flow collector, and the flow collector uses the clustering time patter to prevent the next DDoS attack.
Reference [11] introduces FlowSec to mitigate the attack on the SDN controller, which collects the switch statistic and computes the controller bandwidth dynamically. If the bandwidth utilization exceeds a given value, then the switch port will be slowed down.
It seems that the mitigation method of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is not mature yet, and formal methods are in great need. Based on formalization, Extenics is focused on the possibility of expansion and the rules and methods of innovation, and it is also used to solve the problem of contradiction [12] . The study on mitigation strategy with Extenicsrelated thinking is beneficial to the formation of strategy, and the extension strategy generation method may be a prospective way to generate the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers from the perspective of solving the incompatibility problems.
Application of the Extension Strategy Generation Method
The extension strategy generation method [12] [13] is based on Extenics, which imitates the human thinking mode, and uses formal and quantitative methods to generate strategies for solving incompatibility problems. This section tries to utilize the extension strategy generation method to generate the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers.
Establishment of the Extension Model
The problem of generating the strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is an incompatibility problem. An extension model is first built for this incompatible problem, in which the compatibility degree of this problem is calculated by the correlation function to judge the contradiction degree of the problem.
The goal for the problem of generating the strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is that the controllers are always keep in a good condition, run normally, and respond as quickly as possible in a short time because they are the core of the entire SDN network. The main performance parameters are the average CPU load, the usage rate of memory, the network response time, and the request of disk I/O. They are separately represented by domains 1 V , 2 V , 3 V , and 4 V . The condition for the problem of generating the strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is that an attacker should initiate a DoS attack on the target SDN controller.
The extension model for the problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is then established as Equation (1). 
As is shown in Equation (1), the problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers (P) divides into two parts: the goal G and the condition L . DoS attacks mainly consume CPU, memory, and network bandwidth resources. Therefore, this problem is mainly reflected in three performance indicators of average CPU load, memory usage, and network response time for the SDN controller. The main evaluation features of the network response time for the performance indicators are the time delay (marked as domain 5 V ) and packet loss rate (marked as domain 6 V ). The extension model for the kernel problem of generating the extension strategy for the mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is then established as Equation ( 2). 
According to Equation (2), the average CPU load, memory usage, time delay, and packet loss rate are selected to establish the compatibility function formalized as
Establish Compatibility Function

 
kx for Average CPU Load
The average CPU load is the number of processes that take CPU time for a certain period of time and the number of processes waiting for CPU time. When calculated by the number of CPU cores, the current number of active processes is not greater than 3 in each CPU, which means that the system performance is good. If the current number of active processes is not greater than 4 in each CPU, this means that the system performance is acceptable. If the number is greater than 5, this means the CPU is very busy, the load is high, and the performance of the system is degraded. Hence, the positive domain of the average CPU load is set as
, and the optimal value is set as 3. The compatibility function is then shown as Equation (3). 
for Usage Rate of Memory
The usage rate of memory refers to the ratio of the used memory to the system physical memory, which directly affects the running speed of the host computer. According to practical experiences, when the memory usage value is less than or equal to 70%, the system is running in good condition. However, when the memory usage value is greater than 80%, this will affect the normal operations of the program on the host. Thus, according to the value of memory usage, the operating performance is divided into three levels: high, medium, and low. The compatibility function is shown as Equation (4).
Establish Compatibility Function
 
kx for Time Delay
The time delay refers to the time that it takes for a message or packet to travel from one end of the network to another end, and this directly affects the user's experience. The longer the time delay, the worse the user's experience. Therefore, a low time delay for SDN is expected. For Local Area Network (LAN), the delay generally does not exceed 10 milliseconds, while for Wide Area Network (WAN), the delay is generally greater than 50 milliseconds. Referring to the "People's Republic of China Ministry of Information Industry Order No. 36", the round-trip delay average should be less than or equal to 200 milliseconds. Therefore, the time delay is divided into four levels: excellent, good, medium, and poor. Its compatibility function is established as Equation (5). The packet loss rate refers to the number of lost packets in the test packet ratio of the data sent, which directly reflects the state of the transmission channel. In LAN, under normal circumstances, the packet loss rate is almost zero, but in WAN, the packet loss rate is almost inevitable. However, the packet loss rate is expected to be as low as possible. When the packet loss rate is increased, the performance of HTTP applications will significantly decline. When the packet loss rate reached 1%, the HTTP transmission rate dropped to 10% of the original. Referring to the "People's Republic of China Ministry of Information Industry Order No. 36", the average packet loss rate should be less than or equal to 2%. Thus, the positive domain of the packet loss rate is set as   6 0, 0.02 x= , and the compatibility function is then established as Equation (6) .
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When these four requirements above are achieved, the synthesis compatibility function is shown as Equation (7).
Generation of the Extension Strategy
Based on the extension model proposed above, the extension strategy to solve the incompatible problem of generating the mitigation strategy for DoS attacks against SDN controllers is obtained through extension analysis and extension transformation of the incompatible problem.
According to the calculation results of the compatibility function, the problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers for SDN belongs to an incompatible problem. The extension transformation is then performed to 0 g and 0 l . However, since 0 l is an objective problem, this problem cannot be solved by extension transform to 0 l . The strategy is generated by performing extension transformation to 0 g , as shown in Equation (8 (8) Equation (9) demonstrates the relativity analysis of the average CPU load. 011  011  01  01  012  012   0121  0121  012  012  0122  0122 , , , 
According to Equation (9), the average CPU load is mainly related to the number of processes on the host and the performance of CPU. The CPU performance is mainly determined by two factors: the CPU architecture and allocated number of CPU cores. Therefore, the reduction of the average CPU load can be obtained by the extension transformation of the three conditions mentioned above.
Relativity analysis of the usage rate of memory is shown in Equation (10) . Equation (10) indicates that the usage rate of memory is mainly related to the number of processes running on the host, the memory capacity, and the memory frequency. As for these three related elements, since they are not free to terminate the running processes of the host and memory frequency is fixed, only the extension transformation of the memory capacity can be performed to reduce memory usage.
Since the time delay and the packet loss rate are two closely related evaluation characteristics, both can reflect the state of the network channel. Therefore, the correlation analysis is performed on these two evaluation characteristics together. Equation (11) demonstrates the correlation analysis of the time delay and the packet loss rate. 05  05  07  07  06  06   071  071  072  072  072  072   ,  ,  ack  ate, ,, As is shown in Equation (11), the performance of the network connection is mainly decided by the network bandwidth and the network traffic. The attacker sends a large number of forged packets to the network to consume network bandwidth and degrade network performance. The response time of the SDN controller is then increased, and the latency and packet loss rate of the network are increasing. As for SDN, when traffic enters the switch, the switch will first check the flow table on the switch. If there is a matching entry, the corresponding action is performed, and if there is no matching entry, it will be forwarded to the controller. Therefore, the relative elements are the SDN switch's port, the source host's IP, and the network's bandwidth.
Moreover, the extension transformation of the primitives is then discussed as follows.
Extension Transformation to Primitives in 01 g
According to the conduction conversion, the conversion which is shown as Equation (12) 
The extension transformation described in Equation (13) means that by changing the computing resources of the SDN controller host, such as the number of cores of the CPU, the average CPU load of the host will be impacted. 
Extension Transformation to Primitives in 02 g
According to the conduction conversion, the conversion which is shown as Equation (14) 
The extension transformation described in Equation (15) means that by changing the SDN controller host memory resources, such as the capacity of memory, the usage rate of memory will be impacted. 
Extension Transformation to Primitives in 05 g and 06 g
According to the conduction conversion, the conversion which is shown as Equation (16) 
The extension transformation described in Equation (17) means that by changing host network bandwidth for the SDN controller, the time delay and the packet loss rate will be impacted. 
Experimental Analysis
To validate the feasibility of applying the extension strategy generation method to generate the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers, experiments are performed using VMware Workstation and the virtual machine named Ubuntu 4.8.2-19 ubuntu1. An experimental analysis is then discussed in this section.
Initial Result of Synthesis Compatibility Function
The degree of compatibility needs to be calculated for the incompatibility problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers for SDN controllers. If the degree of compatibility is less than 0, the extension strategy generation method needs to be utilized to generate the mitigation strategy for DoS attacks. If the degree of compatibility is more than 0, the extension transform is an extension strategy to solve the incompatibility problem.
According to the experimental data, the initial result of the synthesis compatibility function is shown in Equation (18). 
Since the degree of compatibility is less than 0, the extension strategy generation method will be utilized to generate the mitigation strategy for DoS attacks.
The Average CPU Load
Experimental results of the average CPU load with no mitigation strategy for DoS attacks is shown in Figure 1 . Increase the number of CPU cores to 4. According to the conduction conversion, the conversion above will result in the following conduction transformation, shown as Equation (20) (20) Figure 2 shows the experimental results of the average CPU load with mitigation strategy for DoS attacks using the extension strategy generation method. 
The Usage Rate of Memory
Experimental results of the usage rate of memory with no mitigation strategy for DoS attacks is shown in Figure 3 . At this time, the usage rate of memory is relatively higher. 
With the mitigation strategy for DoS attacks using the extension strategy generation method, the experimental results of the usage rate of memory are shown in Figure 4 . As indicated in Figure 4 , the memory usage is significantly reduced compared to the case provided in Figure 3 , and increasing the memory capacity to 4.5G is an effective way to reduce the memory usage and recovery performance of the SDN controller.
The Time Delay and the Packet Loss Rate
Experimental results of the time delay and the packet loss rate with no mitigation strategy for DoS attacks are shown in Figure 5 . At this time, both the host time delay and the packet loss rate are at a relatively higher level. 
Increase the bandwidth to 3 times the original one. According to the conduction conversion, the conversion above will result in the following conduction transformation, shown as Equation (24). 
With the mitigation strategy for DoS attacks using the extension strategy generation method, the experimental results of the time delay and packet loss rate are shown in Figure 6 . Figure 6 . The time delay and the packet loss rate with mitigation strategy for DoS attacks
As indicated in Figure 6 , both the host time delay and the packet loss rate are greatly reduced compared to the case shown in Figure 5 , and increasing the bandwidth to 3 times the original one is an effective way to reduce the time delay and the packet loss rate of the SDN controller.
Generation of Mitigation Strategy for DoS Attacks Against SDN Controllers
After using the extension strategy generation method, the degree of compatibility is re-calculated, as shown in Equation (25). 
Since the degree of compatibility by using the extension strategy generation method is greater than 0, the mitigation strategy of DoS attacks against the SDN controller can be 0122 022 071 T T T . This converts an incompatibility issue into a compatibility issue in order to generate the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers.
Conclusion and Future Work
Performance of the controllers is key to ensuring the normal operation of SDN, and the problem of generating the extension strategy for mitigation of DoS attacks against SDN controllers is centered on incompatibility. In this paper, the mitigation strategy of DoS attack against the SDN controller is studied by using the extension strategy generation method from the perspective of solving these incompatibility problems, focusing on the performance of the SDN controllers. The method of the extension strategy generation is based on Extenics and uses formal and quantitative means of generating strategies to solve this incompatibility problem. Thus, it is beneficial for the formalization of the mitigation strategy for DoS attacks against SDN controllers. However, the strategy proposed in this paper is mainly applied to low-intensity short-term DoS attacks, and future works will consider how to deal with high-intensity long-term Dos attacks.
